Diplomacy with Iran is picking up fast. Following recent trips by German, French, Italian and European Union parliamentarians, a delegation of British lawmakers, headed by former minister of foreign affairs Jack Straw, visited Tehran in early January. In December, Emma Bonino, Italy’s foreign minister, became the first senior Western official to visit Iran after the inauguration of the country’s new president Hassan Rouhani, the first such contact in nearly a decade. Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt travelled to Tehran this week for two days of talks with senior officials. Other high-profile visits are already in store.
This ebullient sequence of reconnections holds the promise for more constructive, less adversarial relations between the West and Iran. At the same time, however, more visits – particularly on the parliamentary level – also contain risks. Some MPs, moved by narrow parochial self-interest or ideological bias, might harbour disruptive agendas.

Therefore, to maximize the positive potential of future visits, here are several suggestions – offered by a humble witness present at a number of these recent interactions – that may be considered for upcoming inter-parliamentary exchanges:

1. The process is the payoff.

For the past six years, there were no inter-parliamentary exchanges between the West and Iran. Although now is the time to rebuild trust and connections, major breakthroughs should not be expected. Visiting delegations should measure success not so much in terms of specific deliverables, but in terms of ensuring that dialogue continues. Accordingly, actions that might disrupt these relationships or give Iranian hardliners excuses to sabotage on-going progress should be avoided.

One such red line is meeting with families of political prisoners. It is completely understandable that visiting European MPs may wish to meet with, for example, the families of the Green Movement’s leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and Zahra Rahnavard, who are still under house arrest. In addition to their moral dimensions, such visits give MPs the political cover to domestically defend their decision to travel to Iran.

At this point in time, however, it may be wiser to let the Rouhani administration work toward the release of these prisoners, while continuing to raise the issue at meetings with Iranian officials. The best the West can do for Iran’s political prisoners is to deliver its end of the bargain on the nuclear issue, i.e. sanctions relief, which would create more political space for Rouhani to tackle human rights issues in the country.

[caption id="" align="alignnone" width="357"] MEP Tarja Cronberg, currently serving as Chairperson of the Delegation for EU relations with Iran, and other EU ministers meet with Sakharov prize winners, Jafar Panahi and Nasrin Sotoudeh, in Tehran.
(Photo Credit: Office of Tarja Cronberg)[/caption]

This, of course, does not mean visiting delegations should refrain from meeting human rights defenders, civil society activists, or independent academics whenever possible. Fortunately, in today’s Iran, there is noticeably more space for such contacts than there was under Ahmadinejad’s hyper-securitized presidency. During its visit to Tehran this past December, the EU delegation metwith two Iranian winners of the Sakharov prize, the European Parliament’s highest human rights award, lawyer Nasrine Sotoudeh and filmmaker Jafar Panahi.

While conservative Iranian lawmakers, such as Karim Qoddusi, a member of the foreign affairs and national security committee, subsequently demanded that foreign minister Javad Zarif appear before the parliament to explain this “act of interference in Iran’s internal affairs,” the reaction from the public at large was overwhelmingly positive.

Ms. Soutoudeh and Mr. Panahi, who had been imprisoned and held under house arrest for years, are free now, and, as the chairman of the High Judiciary Human Rights Council Mohammad Javad Larijani himself assured the European delegation, nothing can prevent anybody from meeting with them. Similarly, the social-democratic Austrian MEP Josef Weidenholzer visited the headquarters of the major reformist newspaper Shargh.

Efforts like these should be encouraged, as they enable European representatives to reach out beyond the walls of government to the Iranian media and public.

2. Temper expectations.

Despite evident changes in Iran’s domestic atmosphere, political expectations should not be exaggerated.

While disillusionment with the unfulfilled promises of the 1979 revolution has set in, this does not mean Iranians would favor another revolution. The memories of 1979 – only one generation ago – and the current civil strife in Egypt and Syria act powerful reminders that gradual, incremental change is perhaps Iran’s best hope for a freer, more democratic future.

The notion that the Islamic Republic is capable of internal reform, however, has always been contentious. Indeed, it is possible that Iranians will pursue regime change, if their quest for peaceful change is frustrated. But, if this comes to pass, it must be their decision. It is wholly counter-productive for Western politicians to assume they should “lead” Iranians to “freedom from the ayatollahs;” no Iranian democrat with a shred of credibility would ever welcome such Western intervention.

For many Iranians, the Islamic Republic cannot be reduced to mandatory veiling or floggings for sexual misdemeanours – which the West often identifies it with – but instead represents resistance to the world’s only remaining superpower, as reflected in Ruhi Ramazani’s latest book on Iranian foreign policy, Independence without Freedom. Rather than galvanizing disaffected Iranians, American and European calls to “rise against the theocratic tyranny” are more likely to inspire even the staunchest of secularists to reluctantly rally around the government.

3. Articulate a clear position on sanctions.

If there is anything like a unified national cause in Iran today, it is the lifting of crippling international sanctions imposed on the country, ostensibly because of its nuclear program. No Iranian, whether conservative, reformist, secular or religious, accepts these sanctions as fair and legal.

In response to concerns that the ultimate goal of Iran’s leadership is the attainment of nuclear weapons, many point to a fatwa by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that declares the nuclear weapons haram, or forbidden. Naturally, while Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwas could be taken with a grain of salt, it is ironic that it is precisely those who portray Iran as a fanatical, messianic theocracy who tend to dismiss the Supreme Leader’sfatwa as meaningless.

Iranian officials have also put forward strategic considerations against developing nuclear weapons. As foreign minister Javad Zarif reiterated to the delegation of EU MPs, even the perception that Iran seeks nuclear weapons would be damaging to its own security; it would transform the country’s conventional superiority as the region’s “strongest power” into a “strategic vulnerability,” as neighbouring countries would likely rush to acquire their own nuclear deterrents.

To add insult to injury, many Iranians are incensed that, while they are subjected to all kinds of sanctions merely on suspicion of pursuing a nuclear bomb, countries like Pakistan, with a despicable record of support for Taliban and jihadist groups that are terrorizing India, as well as local Shias, are allowed to maintain a nuclear arsenal outside the non-proliferation regime with ongoing support from the West.

The broad movement against sanctions in the country exists against this backdrop. Recently, a group of Iranian artists and celebrities, including some of the country’s most famous film directors, have petitioned the United Nations over the medicine shortages in Iran caused by the sanctions.

While recent implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, the interim deal signed last November in Geneva, between the six world powers and Iran is certainly cause for optimism and may, in time, herald genuine reconciliation between the West and Iran, it is not enough to simply refrain from imposing new sanctions in the lead-up to the final agreement.

It is also necessary to lift existing restrictions, particularly those that hurt ordinary people most, like ones involving medical supplies. While it is not for European parliamentarians to execute these decisions, voicing support for sanctions relief would send an important political signal both to Iranians and their governments back home. It is also imperative for EU MPs to use transatlantic parliamentary dialogue to convey to their American colleagues that any new sanctions against Iran would risk isolating the United States, not Iran.

4. Engage in a nuanced human rights dialogue.

During the September 2013 meeting of the UN General Assembly, Minister Zarif proposed the renewal of a human rights dialogue between the EU and Iran to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton. Thus far, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s foreign ministry, has shown little enthusiasm for accepting this proposal. The position of the EEAS appears to focus on achieving a final agreement on the nuclear issue, before dealing with other topics regarding Iran.

In the past, this might have made sense. Yet, when it is Iran who offers human rights dialogue, rather than the West, failure to reciprocate will only fuel the narrative propagated by Iranian hardliners that the EU is merely interested in using human rights as a stick to bash Iran.

The EU currently has a partner for dialogue in Tehran; the Rouhani administration has unveiled the new civil rights charter, a pre-election campaign pledge. Granted, the charter has been understandably criticized by reformists (for example, women have been placed under the category of ‘vulnerable citizens’), but it is a start and can be used as a matter of discussion with the EU.

This is where European soft power is at its best. The EU is rich in expertise, staff, benchmarking, and methodology for such talks. To ensure that Iranians do not perceive dialogue on human rights as a one-way imposition of European norms, UN documents should be used as the basis for standards. For example, Iran has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although its domestic legislation and practice is far from respecting its commitments under this treaty.

Any human rights dialogue with Iran will not be easy. For example, the abolition of the death penalty – the EU’s central human rights objective worldwide – is currently out of the question. But, even if this case, there are ways the EU can work to reduce its application. In Iran, the majority of death sentences are imposed for narcotics-related offences. Some Iranian officials recognize that the prolific application of the death penalty against drug traffickers has been ineffective in stemming the drug trade. The EU’s deeper involvement in anti-narcotics cooperation with Iranian officials may contribute to decreasing the frequency of death sentences.

5. Show appreciation for Iranian culture.

Iranians are famously, and justifiably, proud of their culture, history, and civilization. They like to entertain visiting delegations with trips to Isfahan, the country’s second largest city, considered the jewel of the Savafid civilization. For many Western MPs, this may pose a dilemma: since they are already criticized in their home countries for merely visiting the “axis of evil,” going to Isfahan may be perceived as political tourism, a frivolous diversion at the expense of taxpayers. Nothing could, however, be further from truth. A trip to Isfahan is by no means empty tourism. It is a gesture of appreciation for Iranian culture, and as such, an investment in good will and confidence building.

Visitors to Tehran would also be wise to find time to visit some of the city’s vibrant art galleries – Art House with its exhibition halls and hip coffeeshop sporting alcohol-free mojitos is a popular option. Tehran’s excellent Museum of Contemporary Art, inaugurated by Queen Farah in 1977, is another venue in which to get acquainted with the works of Iranian masters and meet English-speaking, liberal Tehranis. These encounters reveal a very different Tehran: a cosmopolitan, creative and vibrant metropolis, thriving under the frozen gaze of pious bearded men staring sternly from the city’s billboards.

6. Fight the fight not only in Tehran, but also in European capitals.

As any European parliamentarian who travels to Tehran knows well, tackling Iranian conservatives is only part of the challenge for those who support diplomacy with the country. Equally exhausting and persistent efforts must be exerted back in Europe.

While there are no shortage of individuals in the European foreign policy establishment who understand the need for engagement with Iran, all too often EU policy toward the country has been monopolized by the Big Three countries – UK, France and Germany – that are directly involved in nuclear negotiations with Iran under the auspices of High Representative Ashton. The Big Three have long hitched their wagons on the nuclear issue to the United States’ combative policies and restrictive measures against Iran.

This has led to a considerable narrowing of perspectives when it comes to policy options. Still, there are alternative voices in the EU: Sweden, Finland, and Austria are remarkably skeptical about the historically narrow American approach to the nuclear standoff and the effectiveness of sanctions to resolve the issue. Italy has taken the lead in seizing upon opportunities created by the election of President Rouhani and the November 2013 Geneva accord. In stark departure from Germany’s previous position on the issue, the country’s new social-democratic foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeyer has indicated his preference for engaging with, rather than isolating, Iran regarding the ongoing Syrian civil war.

Conclusion

The current environment in Iran favors diplomacy. But new opportunities must be seized upon and Rouhani and Zarif must show tangible results in order for their outreach policies to the West to continue. The passive attitude of wait and see or still worse, public Western expressions of skepticism about their abilities to deliver, will undermine Zarif and Rouhani’s efforts and may even realize self-fulfilling prophecies of diplomatic stagnancy and breakdown.

Proponents of engagement with Iran in different EU member states and institutions should build a broad coalition to move their cause forward. This requires focus and copious investment of political capital, but in the end, it will be worthwhile. European citizens clearly do not want another disastrous war in the Middle East. The failure to use this window of opportunity to reach an agreement with Iran and end decades of enmity and distrust will inexorably lead to just such a war; perhaps not by design, but by eliminating a diplomatic alternative.

 

*Eldar Mamedov has degrees from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid, Spain. He has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a diplomat in Latvian embassies in Washington DC and Madrid. Since 2007, Mamedov has served as a political adviser for the social-democrats in the Foreign Affairs committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is in charge of the delegation for inter-parliamentary relations between the EP and Iran. In October 2013, he accompanied the S&D delegation to Iran, the first EP visit in six years, and returned with another delegation in December 2013.

The views set out in this article are solely those of the author in his personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union or the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.

By Muftah

 

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