[caption id="attachment_131428" align="alignright" width="159"] Former EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, left, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, third left, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, rear center, and French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, second right, wait for the start of closed-door nuclear talks with Iran in Vienna, Austria, Friday, Nov. 21, 2014. (AP Photo/Ronald Zak)[/caption]
For those who are trying to keep abreast of the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, the International Crisis Group  has just put out their latest report and recommendations. You can find links an overview of the underlying report, as well as the report itself for greater detail, at the bottom. We are posting ICG’s press release issued Wednesday with permission.
Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes
When twelve months of intense negotiations between Iran and the P5+1/EU3+3 ended with yet another extension, sceptics saw this as confirmation that the talks are doomed. But it would be as grave a mistake to underestimate the real progress as to overstate the chances of ultimate success. A landmark agreement is still within reach if both sides adopt more flexible postures on enrichment capacity and sanctions relief.


Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, also known as the EU3+3) failed to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement by their self-imposed 24 November deadline but have made considerable progress in the past twelve months. Though both sides expressed their political constraints and irreducible requirements for a deal more clearly than before, two core differences remain: the size of Iran’s enrichment capacity and sanctions relief. In its latest briefing, Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes, the International Crisis Group sheds light on deficiencies of the talks thus far, examines both sides’ concerns and redlines, and argues that an accord can still be reached without violating either side’s core principles and interests.


The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:

• Iran’s redlines are two-fold: recognition of its right to industrial-scale enrichment and that any irreversible concessions it makes will be met with commensurate relief on sanctions, specifically their termination, not just suspension. For its part, the P5+1 insists on denying Iran a breakout time – the interval required to enrich enough fissile material for one weapon – of less than a year and on maintaining the sanctions architecture, even if some are suspended, for the duration of the comprehensive agreement.


• To expedite talks, Iran and the U.S. should immediately reactivate a quiet diplomatic channel to find a solution that takes into account their respective domestic constraints and core interests. In parallel, France, Germany and the UK should join forces to alleviate the concerns of the U.S. Congress, Israel and Arab states by clearly explaining the merits of an agreement and bolstering their security and strategic cooperation.


• Both sides are excessively concerned with the number of centrifuges permitted by a putative agreement. Iran will have no need for its currently operational enrichment capacity in the near future; the West has no reason to fear an Iranian breakout in declared and closely monitored facilities with a limited number of centrifuges.


• There is a credible path to a long-lasting deal. It would require Iran to postpone its plans for industrial-scale enrichment while the P5+1 countenances controlled growth of that enrichment program and clearly defines target dates for a phased lifting of sanctions. The U.S. Congress should refrain from passing new sanctions that could undermine the diplomatic process and erode the P5+1’s unity.