Alwaght- Being a complicated and ambiguous challenge, the Kurdish issue has frequently been a trigger for tensions between the Turkish central government and the Kurdish parties and groups. In recent years, Turkey�s ruling party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), has changed its approach towards Kurds and region generally, however, due to inconsistency in Kurdish side and among Turkish groups and political parties, the two sides failed to reach a comprehensive solution for the long-standing conflict.

After an agreement between the two sides was reached, there were hopes that a ceasefire and peace would be possible, but as the time went on it came out that at least in the short run this is not feasible, because a continued peace deal has many opponents and advocates involved, and their opposing directions could affect the course of any future negotiations.

Held on June 7, 2015, the Turkish parliamentary elections and their outcome have essentially reshuffled the equations. Passing 10 per cent electoral threshold, the Kurdish People�s Democratic Party (HDP), led by Salahattin Demirtas, won 13.12% of votes, securing 80 seats in the Turkey�s parliament.

Following the Kurdish breakthrough, a suicide bomb attack on a Kurdish gathering in Suruc, a Turkey-Syria border town, has sparked intensification of Turkey government�s measures against Kurds, pushing the conflict between arch-foes to upgrade to a new stage. Regarding the multiple aspects of the escalation, it is of significance to examine the motives and results of Turkish military moves against the Kurds.

Internal motives of Turkish military actions
Being backed by Turkish liberals and leftists, the Kurds with third HDP, ever since foundation of the Republic of Turkey, have managed to surpass the 10% threshold and enter the Turkish parliament, challenging the single-party dominated political system in Turkey, gaining the possibility to demonstrate and prove their power as a decisive political party.

The HDP�s election manifesto is inundated with new leftism and radical democratic ideas. The young and dynamic HDP�s manifesto notes that, especially after Syria�s Kurdistan recent developments and Kobani�s resistance in the face of ISIS and pushing back the terrorist group, which made the party rise afresh, the party is intending to turn into a representation of not only the Kurds generally but also all of those suppressed and marginalized in Turkey.

Making a variety of demands on behalf of different spectrums of the society including women, youth, children, workers, and even the transsexual people, the party has been in race to draw maximum support.

The issue of powerful rise of a Kurdish political party has made the Turkish government worried about penetration of Kurds in the country�s political structure through legal channels. As HDP includes a coalition of independent activists, leftist, Kurdish, Levantine, Armenian, Zaza, Alawite, Roma and Yazidi parties, its entrance to turkey's parliament could challenge President Recep Tayyip Erdogan�s AK party.

In fact, most of the parties, organizations and people in Turkey who voted for the Kurdish party, consider its entrance to Turkish parliament as the only way to check the establishment of Erdogan and his party�s dictatorship.

Anyway, winning over 10% of the votes by HDP in the parliamentary elections meant a drop in AKP's votes. Indeed, after a series of events such as killing Kurdish youths in Robosky airstrikes by Turkey�s jets, negative standing of AKP on the Kurdish town of Kobani in Syria while it was attacked by ISIS terrorist group, and highlighting the issue of Kurdish Quran by the Turkish president have pushed most of the Kurds who previously had voted for the Erdogan�s party to drop their support, redirecting their votes for the HDP�s Party.

Moreover, the secular Kurds who had voted for AKP with the hope of progress of negotiations between the government and Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of PKK that is an armed group active in Turkey, also withdrew their votes from the Turkish ruling party, casting them for the Kurdish party.

The votes all were subtracted not from the People�s Republican Party or National Movement Party�s shares in the parliament but only from AK Party�s. Consequently, the parliamentary elections displayed that AK Party�s popularity sharply dropped among the Kurds in Turkey.

While a majority of the Kurds living in Istanbul and a big percentage of those living in Kurdish areas had formerly voted for candidates from Turkey�s ruling party, in recent elections they rethought their support and preferred voting for HDP. For example, in Turkey�s southern provinces, mostly populated by the Kurds, the AKP has lost big amount of its votes, as in Diyarbakir the Turkish party in 2011 had 11 MPs, but this number dropped to only 1 MP in recent elections.

The decrease in votes of the Kurds for the Erdogan�s party has made him despaired at winning their favor in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The president, having no hope for any Kurdish favor for his party in the future, started a fighting against the Kurds, following two purposes.
Firstly, Mr. Erdogan was seeking Turkey�s nationalists� to able to form a single-party government support because they keenly back any suppression and violent escalation against the Kurds.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan�s second objective of escalation of violence against the Kurds was to despair them and hamper their presence in the Turkish elections and political participation. In fact, Turkey with military action is eyeing to keep the Kurds from taking part in the country�s upcoming elections, disappointing them from any peaceful change and development. Falling Kurdish turnout in the parliamentary polls ahead would mean less votes for HDP, and, considering the Turkey�s electoral system, the AKP will have the opportunity to collect more votes.

External motives of Turkish military action
The most significant external push behind Turkey�s military escalation against the Kurds is the Syrian gains against terrorists and Ankara�s concerns over increasing bonds between the Kurds in Syria and Turkey. Indeed, since the onset of clashes between Syrian Kurds and ISIS, Turkish government has been worried about Kurds' victory over the terrorist group. In recent weeks, clashes between the Kurds and the ISIS terrorist group have intensified, and the Kurdish forces have held Kobani and Tal Abyad towns, and they struggled to reclaim the ISIS-held town of Jerablos and other areas in Syria�s north.

All these gains have left Turkey concerned. So Turkey has intention to disrupt and block the communication lines of the Kurds who are in an effort to connect the Syria�s separate Kurdish cantons to each other. Ankara is severely worried about the connection of the cantons and the Kurds� access to the Mediterranean Sea, an issue which could transform their position geopolitically, facilitate their access to the sea, and would solve one of their most thorny problems, namely being surrounded with lands.

Ankara, moreover, is concerned about proximity and convergence of the Syria�s Kurdish forces and their proponents inside Turkey, an issue which could heavily affect the Turkey�s Kurds. Because ethnic bonds and consistency between the Kurds in Syria and Turkey could prepare the ground for reactions inside the country, in a way that in case of any incident inside Syria, the Kurds in Turkey would move quickly for protective measures. This issue makes the Turkish governments worried about increasing strength of Kurds in Syria, and fearful about Syria-Turkey�s Kurds' links.

Intending to cut off Turkish communication lines, Turkey has ostensibly declared war against the terrorist group ISIS, and pushed to persuade the Western countries for establishing a no-fly zone over Syria to block Turkey�s Kurds� links with Syria. The no-fly zone that Ankara has in mind stretches from Idlib province in Syria which shares border with Turkey�s Hatay province to Aleppo and Kobani provinces, that encompasses 90 kilometers long with the depth of 40 to 50 kilometers. The safe zone covers an area starting from northeastern city of Jerablos near the Euphrates River to Marea town in Aleppo�s north.
Although, Turkey has mentioned a set of reasons such as stopping the flow of Syrian refugees, guiding the crisis out of its soil, and preventing infiltration of militants under the guise refugees to justify establishment of a buffer zone over Syria, the main motives behind the Turkish plan are to hit the Syrian legitimate government and disconnect the Kurds� connections in Syrian-Turkish borders.

Turkish military action�s perspective
Clearly, the Kurdish issue cannot be settled using suppression and violent military actions. Being a significant part of Turkish community, the Kurdish people cannot be ignored by the government in the country�s future, especially that they have ethnic roots outside Turkey�s borders, and have military branches in the region and diplomatic delegations in the European countries that altogether are able to leave long-term impacts on Turkish government in.

So, using military option, Turkey government would not be able to solve the Kurdish issue in the long run especially that continuation of the militarized conditions would result in worsened economic conditions and many security challenges. In addition, military actions against the Kurds have been internationally slammed. The waves of criticism highlight the fact that the Turkish government has exploited the campaign against ISIS to carry out its attacks on the Kurds and quell them.

Accordingly, it is likely that Erdogan is depicting the situation as critical, tense and warlike in order to secure the majority in the coming parliamentary elections to form a strong cabinet. Portraying Turkish borders as insecure, the President Erdogan seeks pressing ahead with his authoritarian project to push the public to vote for a mighty government. Highlighting the Kurdish forces as terrorist groups and even plotting terrorist attacks in Syrian borders could yield the wanted results and make President Erdogan reach his goals.

It should not be forgotten that Erdogan�s party has lost votes from two sides, one side is the votes of the Kurds who were exposed to hostility, and the other side is the votes of the far-left nationalists who were attracted by Nationalist Movement Party. This is while the military moves against the Kurdish forces could once again restore the nationalists� vote in favor of Erdogan�s AKP.

However, maintaining their unity and consistency inside Turkey voting for the HDP in the coming parliamentary elections, Kurds would be able to once again challenge the Turkish future government�s formation. In fact, as in the previous elections the HDP had passed 10% threshold, and put an end to President Erdogan�s aspiration to change the Turkish political system, it seems that Kurds would be able to gain their political goals in case they actively participate in Turkey�s political scene. Indeed, in case of repeating victory in the upcoming Turkish Parliamentary election, Kurds would be even more powerful than before, an issue which in the future empowers them to participate in Turkey�s political system�s decision making.

By Alwaght